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"VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT" OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP: A PROPOSED DEFINITION
Faced with the question whether an American citizen could consti-
tutionally be deprived of his citizenship for voting in a foreign election,
the Supreme Court held in 1958 that Congress could provide for such
expatriation as a reasonable means of preventing embarrassment to the
United States in its foreign relations.1 When the same question arose in
1967,2 the Court overruled its prior decision, declaring that since the
fourteenth amendment3 describes a citizenship "which a citizen keeps
unless he voluntarily relinquishes it," 4 Congress may not forcibly expa-
triate a citizen. The Court gave no clear indication of the meaning of
"voluntary relinquishment," and there is some doubt whether any acts
short of an express, formal renunciation may provide grounds for expa-
triation.5
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Afroyim v. Rusk,6 stated
that the Court "agree[d] with THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissent in [Perez v.
Brownell] ... that the Government is without power to rob a citizen of
his citizenship under § 401(e) [of the Nationality Act of 1940]."8
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez, however, appears more lim-
ited than the majority opinion in Afroyim in restricting the power of
Congress to define acts of expatriation. The Chief Justice, after stating
that the fourteenth amendment rendered the right to retain United
States citizenship immune from the exercise of governmental powers,
added that "under some circumstances [the citizen] may be found to
have abandoned his status by voluntarily performing acts that compro-
1 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). The case upheld the constitutionality of the
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 4, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1168-69, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5)
(1964), which provided for expatriation for voting in a foreign election.
2 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
3 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the
United States ...... U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 Afroyim v. Rusk, 587 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).
5 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1964), provides
for expatriation of a citizen for such acts short of an express renunciation as: (1) obtain-
ing naturalization in a foreign state; (2) taking an oath or declaration of allegiance to
a foreign state; (3) serving in the army of a foreign state without permission from the
United States; (4) accepting employment with a foreign government, for which position
an acquisition of foreign nationality or a declaration of allegiance is required; (5) voting
in a foreign political election; (6) desertion in time of war; (7) treason; and (8) departing
from the United States in time of war for the purpose of evading the draft.
6 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
7 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
8 387 U.S. at 267.
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mise his undivided allegiance to his country."" The problem is spelled
out clearly by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Afroyim:
It is appropriate to note at the outset what appears to be a
fundamental ambiguity in the opinion for the Court. The Court
at one point intimates, but does not expressly declare, that it
adopts the reasoning of the dissent of THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Perez
.... [I]t seems instead to adopt a substantially wider view of the
restrictions upon Congress' authority in this area. Whatever the
Court's position, it has assumed that voluntariness is here a term
of fixed meaning; in fact, of course, it has been employed to de-
scribe both a specific intent to renounce citizenship, and the un-
coerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to be a
relinquishment of citizenship. Until the Court indicates with
greater precision what it means by "assent," today's opinion will
surely cause still greater confusion in this area of the law.10
I
THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO EXPATRIATION: AVOIDING THE ISSUE
An analysis of past expatriation cases serves only to highlight the
problem. Such conduct as desertion from United States forces in war-
time," employment in a munitions factory of an enemy country during
war,12 residence abroad for a period of years with no intention to re-
turn, 3 and voting in a foreign election 14 has been dismissed by the Su-
preme Court as "ambiguous,"' 5 equivocal,""' and "in no way [evidenc-
ing] a voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance."'17 But the
Court has not stressed the facts of the cases; rather, it has concluded that
the statutory provisions reviewed 8 were so broadly drawn that they em-
braced conduct that did not necessarily indicate a transfer of allegiance
or a renunciation of citizenship.
9 Perez v. Brownell, 856 U.S. 44, 78 (1958).
10 387 US. at 269 n.I.
11 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
13 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
14 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
15 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723 (1952).
16 See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (Black, J., concurring).
17 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964).
18 The statutory provisions reviewed were cited by the Court as sections of the
Nationality Act of 1940. The 1940 Act was superseded by the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. The provisions reviewed correspond to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1964) (voting
in a foreign political election, see Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(8) (1964) (desertion in time of war; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1484(a)(1) (1964) (residence abroad in the country of the other nationality; see Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)).
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Dissenting in Perez v. Brownell, Chief Justice Warren described as
the precise issue whether voting in a foreign election( t'invariably in-
volves a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show voluntary
abandonment of citizenship,7 9 not whether the particular vote in ques-
tion demonstrated voluntary abandonment. He suggested that Congress
had employed an overly broad classification encompassing conduct that
did not demonstrate voluntary abandonment-the citizen might have
voted in a local foreign election merely to choose whether wine or beer
should be sold in the town in which he was residing.20 In Afroyim, the
Court again treated the expatriation issue as more theoretical than fac-
tual. It set up the problem in terms of whether Congress had the power
to terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation.
21
Where the Court has analyzed the facts, its purpose has been pri-
marily to determine whether a particular renunciatory act was commit-
ted voluntarily or under duress.22 It has not really considered whether
the act in question, if voluntarily committed, could constitutionally be
held to have an expatriating effect. Thus, the Court has managed to
avoid the task of defining "voluntary relinquishment" of citizenship.
The mere recitation of the phrase has been sufficient to strike down pro-
visions of the nationality acts that were drawn too broadly. But since
Congressional legislation will not always be susceptible to constitu-
19 356 U.S. at 75.
20 Id. at 76-77. Justice Douglas expressed similar views in his separate dissent. Id.
at 83. See also Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163 (1964), where it was held that living abroad by a naturalized or native-born citizen
was no evidence of lack of allegiance.
21 [P]etitioner contended that the only way he could lose his citizenship was by
his own voluntary renunciation of it. . . . [T]he Government took the position
that § 401(e) empowers it to terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary
renunciation .... The District Court and the Court of Appeals ... held that
Congress has constitutional authority forcibly to take away citizenship for voting
in a foreign country based on its implied power to regulate foreign affairs. Con-
sequently, petitioner was held to have lost his American citizenship regardless
of his intention not to give it up. This is precisely what this Court held in
Perez v. Brownell ....
387 U.S. at 255.
22 See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133
(1952). See also Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in Expatriation Law, 54 CoLumt. L. Rv.
932 (1954). A possible exception is Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), where
the Supreme Court upheld a jury finding that a Japanese of dual nationality, who had
committed various acts of allegiance to Japan during World War II, had not intended
to renounce his American citizenship and therefore could be found guilty of treason.
The case is unique because the petitioner had asserted, in defense to the treason charge,
that he had intended to renounce his American citizenship. The Court upheld the jury's
determination that Kawakita's acts were too equivocal ciearly to constitute expatriation
under the Nationality Act of 1940. Employment in a privately owned munitions factory
was held not to be government employment under § 401(d).
1968]
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tional attack on the grounds of broadness, a workable definition of "vol-
untary relinquishment" must be developed for future application.
II
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFINING
"VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT"
If the Afroyim rationale is to be respected, any comprehensive defi-
nition of "voluntary relinquishment" must, of course, reflect the inten-
tion of the person performing the expatriating acts. Intention to relin-
quish citizenship must be either express 23 or inferred from the volun-
tary act. If the intent to relinquish citizenship is to be inferred from acts
falling short of an express, formal renunciation, then the Court must de-
cide what acts demonstrate an intent to expatriate. It can attack this
problem directly, by describing the type of conduct that will result in
expatriation, or it can take a case-by-case approach, reserving judgment
on any acts not involved in the particular case before the Court.
The case-by-case method, which the Court has frequently employed
in approaching difficult problems relating to definition of constitutional
standards, seems to be an unsatisfactory method of handling the expatri-
ation issue. In the past, use of the method reflected a need for flexibility
and measured change so that the states could adjust to the federal gov-
ernment's presence in areas that previously had been only of state con-
cern.24 In the expatriation cases, there is no federal-state relationship in-
volved, since expatriation is a matter concerning the federal government
and the citizen. Thus, there is no compelling reason to leave the citi-
23 See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, § 1, Rav. STAT. § 1999 (1875), which declared
the inherent right of all people voluntarily to expatriate themselves. Current provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provide machinery for voluntary expa-
triation. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(6), (7), 1483(a) (1964).
24 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961), where the Court, in holding in-
admissible in a state court evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment, ex-
plained its long delay in applying federal constitutional standards of admissibility to the
states:
Some five years after [Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)], in answer to a
plea made here Term after Term that we overturn its doctrine on applicability
of the [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 3883 (1914),] exclusionary rule, this Court
indicated that such should not be done until the States had "adequate oppor-
tunity to adopt or reject the [Weeks] rule." Irvine v. California, [347 U.S. 128,
134 (1954)].
See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), where the Court, recognizing the
difficulties that the local school boards would experience as a result of the school deseg-
regation decisions (Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), remanded the cases to
the local district courts to set standards in accordance with local conditions.
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zen's rights in doubt.25 It would be helpful for the Court to inform
the citizen of what acts will result in expatriation under current legisla-
tion and to provide Congress with clear constitutional standards to
assist in drafting new expatriation legislation.
III
A PROPOSED DEFINITION
A. The Non-Dual National
In the case of a non-dual national, i.e., a citizen only of the United
States, any definition of "voluntary relinquishment" that embraces con-
duct short of acquiring a foreign nationality seems unnecessarily and un-
fairly broad.26 For a non-dual national, 27 conduct such as taking an oath
of allegiance to a foreign government, working for a foreign govern-
ment, or serving in a foreign army might indicate a lack of allegiance to
the United States and an adherence to a foreign nation.28 On the other
hand, a citizen might intend his adherence to the foreign government to
be for a specific political objective short of expatriation. For example,
his act of allegiance to a foreign nation may be prompted by religious or
philosophic affinity to that nation.29 An oath of allegiance might be only
an oath of support to the foreign nation prompted by the circumstances
and lasting only until the circumstances change. Moreover, the de-
scribed conduct may fall short of a permanent adherence to a foreign na-
25 The State Department has an interest in expatriation since it is responsible for
protecting citizens abroad. But the executive branch has great discretion in providing
protection in a given set of circumstances. A citizen may temporarily "expatriate" him-
self, for State Department purposes, by placing himself in a situation that is diplomati-
cally embarrassing for the United States. Since the Department is not compelled to pro-
vide protection for every citizen in such circumstances, a narrow formulation of "voluntary
relinquishment" of citizenship by the Supreme Court would not necessarily hinder the
Department's discretion. Diplomatic assistance could still be refused where a citizen is not
deemed to have relinquished his citizenship. Moreover, Congress can assist the State De-
partment by providing penalties for proscribed conduct. See p. 332 & note 43 infra.
26 An express, formal renunciation, however, even without an acquisition of a for-
eign nationality, should be sufficient, since it dearly indicates an intent permanently to
renounce citizenship.
27 The fourteenth amendment precludes treating the native-born non-dual national
differently from the naturalized non-dual national. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163,
165 (1964):
[Tihe rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person
are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the
Constitution is that only the "natural born" citizen is eligible to be President.
Art. II, § 1.
28 See note 5 supra.
29 More specifically, Americans who fought in an Israeli-Arab war or in the Spanish
Civil War probably did not intend to relinquish their American citizenship.
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tionality or a permanent renunciation of American citizenship. In any
event, if a citizen truly intends to renounce his citizenship, he will prob-
ably first acquire another citizenship rather than risk the perils of state-
lessness3 0
There is a strong policy argument for requiring that a citizen ac-
quire a foreign nationality before he can be declared expatriated. A citi-
zen who is declared expatriated without having acquired another na-
tionality will be rendered stateless. A stateless person "is not considered
as a national by any State under the operation of its law."'3 No state can
protect him against any other state.82 In addition, a stateless person can
be expelled from the state of his original nationality and from any other
state, and, under international law, the country that deprived him of his
nationality need not readmit him.38 The problem of statelessness is suffi-
ciently serious to concern such international organizations as the United
Nations, which has suggested that states reexamine their nationality
laws with the view of curtailing the number of cases of statelessness&
4
30 "Only a singularly thoughtless citizen would surrender his citizenship without
securing another." Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARv. L. Rv.
1510, 1515 (1960). Agata, Involuntary Expatriation and Schneider v. Rush, 27 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1, 39 n.170 (1965), states that "without an express renunciation, renunciation cannot
be implied from an act involving no new loyalty, because of the unlikelihood of a person
making himself stateless."
81 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, [1954] Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS
369, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 17/5/rev. 1 (1954).
32 H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (2d ed. 1966).
38 Id. at 373 n.73. See P. WEIs, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 243 (1956). Weis states:
Since . . .nationality is the principal link between the individual and inter-
national law, and since "the rules of international law relating to diplomatic
protection are based on the view that nationality is the essential condition for
securing to the individual the protection of his rights in the international
sphere," there cannot be any doubt that statelessness is undesirable.
Id. at 166 (footnote omitted). But see Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Per-
sons, [1954] Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 369, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 17/5/rev. 1 (1954), which provides
in Article 31: "The contracting states shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their
territory save on grounds of national security or public order." The exceptions, however,
may be broader than the rule as "national security or public order" may be interpreted
to justify the expulsion of any undesirable.
34 The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted, on August 11,
1950, a Resolution on Provisions relating to the Problem of Statelessness (Resolution 319
B III (XI), U.N. Doc. E/1814 (1950)):
The Economic and Social Council,
Considering that statelessness entails serious problems both for individuals
and for States, and that it is necessary both to reduce the number of stateless
persons and to eliminate the causes of statelessness,
Invites States to . .. re-examine their nationality laws with a view to re-
[Vol. 53:325
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The United States should not add to the problem by enforcing an overly
broad policy of expatriation.
Even the acquisition of a foreign nationality should not be enough,
without more, to constitute expatriation. In many countries, certain acts
of allegiance by an alien automatically result in naturalization. Al-
though the international community generally does not recognize the
compulsory naturalization of aliens and holds that there must be some
specific voluntary act committed by the individual in order for him to
acquire a new nationality, a state may formulate rules concerning an
implicit acceptance of a new nationality.35 For example, the Nationality
Law of Israel of 195236 makes every Jewish immigrant to Israel an Israeli
national unless he specifically declares that he does not desire to become
one.37 And in some states acquisition of domicile and entry into govern-
ment service automatically result in nationality for the individual3 s De-
fining "voluntary relinquishment" as any act resulting in the acquisition
of a foreign nationality does not take into account whether the citizen
intended to acquire the foreign nationality. This definition would cast
expatriation as a sanction for the conduct leading to foreign nationality,
an unacceptable result under the reasoning of Trop v. Dulles."9 It would
ducing as far as possible the number of cases of statelessness created by the
operation of such laws ....
P. WEis, supra note 3, at 169.
S5 P. WEis, supra note 33, at 242. Weis states further:
[International law recognizes that] [a]cceptance of the offer [of naturalization]
may be explicit or implied. The rule covers, therefore, a wider field than vol-
untary naturalisation, which requires an explicit request by the person wishing
to acquire the new nationality.
Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
36 P. Wins, supra note 33, at 118 n. 7, quoting Official Gazette, No. 93, at 22.
37 Id. at 118-19, quoting Official Gazette, No. 93, at 22.
38 Id. at 101. Until 1939, when the law was changed, aliens acquiring real estate in
Mexico and failing to make a declaration of their national origin thereby automatically
became Mexican nationals. Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo. WASH.
L. Ruv. 427, 440 (1949).
39 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Congress had declared that desertion during wartime would
result in expatriation. The Court stated that "the deprivation of citizenship is not a
weapon that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen's conduct,
however reprehensible that conduct may be." Id. at 92-93. The decision was based, at
least partly, on the holding that expatriation used as a penalty violates the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. "If the statute imposes a dis-
ability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter
others, etc.-it has been considered penal." Id. at 96. Blanket expatriation for any ac-
quisition of foreign nationality may well constitute a penalty under this definition, and
therefore may violate the eighth amendment. For distinctions between penal and regu-




also give too much effect to the broad naturalization laws of some for-
eign states.40
Since intent to acquire a foreign nationality cannot be inferred
from every acquisition of new nationality, the Government should have
the burden of proving that the citizen engaged in the activity with the
intent to acquire the foreign nationality-that is, that the individual
knew with substantial certainty that the result of his activity would give
him a new nationality. Further, he should be motivated by the desire to
acquire a new citizenship and not just by the desire to do service in a
foreign army which results in new citizenship. 41 Supplemental acts that
demonstrate an intent to renounce United States citizenship could be in-
troduced as evidence.42 1 In order to deter citizens from hindering United
States relations abroad, the Government can provide sanctions for this
conduct under its powers to regulate foreign affairs and to punish for
treason.43 Expatriation is unnecessary.
The best test of whether a non-dual national has relinquished his
United States citizenship is whether he has either intentionally acquired
the citizenship of a foreign nation or voluntarily and formally re-
nounced his American citizenship. This takes account of the goals dis-
cussed-to reflect intent accurately, and to reduce cases of statelessness.
The acquisition of a foreign nationality does not necessarily con-
note a renunciation of American citizenship, although in most cases
where a new nationality has been intentionally acquired, the old nation-
ality is rejected, or at least superseded. But the intentional acquisition of
such nationality does connote a division of allegiance. In light of the ob-
ligations of citizenship, primarily the defense of the homeland against
all enemies, a classification that imputes renunciatory intent to all citi-
zens intentionally acquiring a foreign nationality seems justified.4
40 See note 38 supra.
41 Of course, the conduct must be engaged in voluntarily. See Nishikawa v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 129 (1958). See also Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in Expatriation Law, 54
CoLum. L. REv. 932 (1954).
42 See Comment, Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HAiv.
L. REv. 643, 732 (1953).
43 Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), where the Court upheld the right of the
Secretary of State to refuse to issue a passport for travel to Cuba. Although the Court
did not pass on the question whether the executive branch can apply criminal sanctions
for violations of travel bans, there appears no strong constitutional objection to such sanc-
tions if they are reasonable and established by Congress. Cf. United States v. Laub, 385
U.S. 475 (1967), which, while holding that § 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1964), does not provide for criminal sanctions for travel
to Cuba, left open the question whether Congress can constitutionally provide such
sanctions.
44 A citizen becomes a dual national when he obtains a new citizenship without
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B. The Dual National
Nationality is primarily based on two systems: descent (jus san-
guinis) and place of birth (jus soli). By the rule of jus sanguinis, an indi-
vidual born of parents of a certain nationality ipso facto acquires the
same nationality. By the rule of jus soli, a person acquires the national-
ity of the country in which he was born. Many nations, including the
United States, have rules based on both theories. If a person is born in
a state with a jus soli system, and of parents who are nationals of a jus
sanguinis state, he acquires dual nationality at birth.45 Dual nationality
may also be acquired through naturalization.46
Since the American citizen of dual nationality is also a foreign na-
tional and, under international law, has obligations to both countries,
unless he renounces one citizenship, some form of allegiance to a foreign
state already exists. The Supreme Court has held that the mere obser-
vance of this allegiance is not sufficient to expatriate a citizen.
[D]ual nationality [is] a status long recognized in the law. The
concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have and
exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to
the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that he asserts the rights
of one citizenship does not without more mean that he renounces
the other.47
In order to hold that a dual national has voluntarily relinquished
his citizenship by an act short of an express, formal renunciation, the
Court must find an intent to renounce American citizenship in an act
that derogates from the individual's obligations as a citizen of the Uni-
ted States.48 The test employed must reflect the pressures on the dual na-
relinquishing the old. Such a citizen "may have and exercise rights of nationality in two
countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both." Kawakita v. United States, 343
U.S. 717, 723 (1952). The citizen is subject to conflicting allegiances which may cause both
nations to distrust him and perhaps result in international friction. Thus, dual nationality
is not something that should be encouraged by holding strictly to the doctrine that a
citizen relinquishes his United States citizenship only by an express renunciation. See
Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE LJ. 545, 693 (1921); Note, Expatriating
The Dual National, 68 YALE L.J. 1167 (1959). The United Kingdom, however, revised its
Nationality Act in 1948 to provide that a person does not lose his British nationality
by the voluntary acquisition of another nationality. See P. W~is, supra note 33, at 195.
45 See Flournoy supra note 44, at 545.
48 See note 44 supra.
47 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1952) (citations omitted). This
doctrine was applied by te court of appeals in Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir.
1958), where a dual national residing in the Philippines, who did not know that he was
also a United States citizen, took an oath to support the Philippine Constitution in the
course of obtaining a Philippine passport.
48 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d
379 (3d Cir. 1958). The jury found that the petitioner in Kawakita performed acts of
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tional to fulfill his obligations to the nation in which he resides. For ex-
ample, courts have held that service by a dual national in the army of his
other nationality, even if the army is hostile to the United States, is
involuntary when compulsory under the conscription laws of totali-
tarian nations.49 Voluntariness must be proved by the Government by
"clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence," 50 before the citizen can
be expatriated.
The voluntary relinquishment test should be satisfied only when the
dual national freely engages in hostile activity for the state of his second
nationality that he knows to be inconsistent with the obligations of
United States citizenship. By emphasizing hostile acts freely performed,
this test recognizes that there must be a choice to act in order for an
act to be voluntary. Thus, by voluntarily fighting in the foreign army
in a war against the United States, or voluntarily committing a treason-
ous act against the United States for the country of his other national-
ity, the citizen is acting freely. An agreement to commit hostile acts
against the United States provides an inference that the dual national
has renounced his obligations to this country and has chosen the na-
tionality he prefers. 51
The test also requires that the citizen be acting for the country of
his second nationality. This distinguishes between expatriating activity,
which involves a choice of citizenship, and treason, which generally does
not. A citizen who commits a hostile act against the United States that is
unrelated to an adherence to his other nationality may have engaged in
treasonous conduct, but he will not be expatriated because he has not
chosen one citizenship over the other.
To illustrate both aspects of the test's operation, if a dual national
were to refuse to serve in the United States armed forces in a war against
the other country of which he is a citizen, the refusal might be inconsis-
tent with the obligations of his American citizenship. But it does not
hostility towards the United States, consisting of cruel treatment of American prisoners
of war, that he was not required by Japan to perform. Yet, the Court held he was not
expatriated. The implications of Kawakita's conduct prior to the atrocities were too am-
biguous to fit the provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940. Thus, he was still a citizen
at the time of the alleged treason. The atrocities themselves had not been classified as
expatriating by the Nationality Act of 1940.
49 Morizumi v. Acheson, 101 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Tomasicchio v. Acheson,
98 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1951); see Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952). See also Note,
"Voluntary": A Concept in Expatriation Law, 54 COLUTm. L. Rav. 932 (1954).
50 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129; 133 (1958).
51 Since the treasonous act would also be an expatriating act, the individual could
not be prosecuted for treason but only for war crimes or espionage. Cf. Kawakita v.
United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
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constitute an overt, hostile act for the other country. Although the citi-
zen may be subject to the ordinary penalties for refusing to serve in the
armed services, he has not indicated a preference for his other citizen-
ship and therefore is not expatriated.
It has been suggested that the problem of dual citizenship could be
better solved by providing for a formal election machinery which would
force the dual national to choose, at majority, which citizenship he pre-
fers than by looking for a renunciatory intent in the dual citizen's
acts.52 But it is doubtful whether compelling such a choice is con-
stitutional. Since the right to retain United States citizenship is absolute,
absent a voluntary act of relinquishment, placing a condition on that cit-
izenship-that the dual national give up his dual nationality in order to
retain his United States citizenship-seems to conflct with Afroyim's in-
terpretation of the fourteenth amendment.5 3
Even if the constitutional question were resolved in favor of the
election, the nature of the choice should cause Congress to reflect upon
the wisdom of such proposed legislation because of the strong possibility
of coercion. The state of residence of the dual national at the time he
must make his election (assuming the state is not a third country) will
greatly influence his choice, especially if choosing the other state's cit-
izenship would force him to leave his state of residence. 4 Although
dual citizenship should not be encouraged, its difficulties are probably
outweighed by the burdens that would be placed on the citizen who is
forced to choose between his two nationalities.
CONCLUSION
A citizen should be held to have "voluntarily relinquished" his
American citizenship only if he voluntarily and formally renounces that
citizenship in a manner prescribed by law, or if he voluntarily and inten-
tionally acquires a foreign nationality. If he is a dual national, he should
52 See Note, Expatriating the Dual National, 68 YALE L.J. 1167, 1181 (1959). See also
Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545 (1921).
53 Afroyim appears to hold that the fourteenth amendment does not recognize a
qualified citizenship. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967), where the Court
stated:
To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he
voted in a foreign election ...would be equivalent to holding that Congress
has the power to "abridge," "affect," "restrict the effect of," and "take . . .
away" citizenship. . . . [Tihe Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from
doing any of these things ....
See also id. at 268.
54 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 requires that a United States na-
tional take up residence outside the United States and its possessions in order for his
expatriating acts to become effective. 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a) (1964).
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be held to have relinquished his citizenship only if he voluntarily com-
mits a hostile act for the state of his other nationality and knows the act
is inconsistent with the obligations of his American citizenship. This
test of "voluntary relinquishment" should assist the Supreme Court and
Congress in categorizing expatriating conduct. The test also reflects the
mandate of the fourteenth amendment, that expatriation must be a vol-
untary act of relinquishment, which ordinarily involves a free choice of
one citizenship over another.
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